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The idea of a guaranteed income has a long 
and respectable history in Canadian political 
and economic thought. Recently, in the face of 
both wide criticism of the Canadian income se-
curity system and growing recognition of the 
unacceptability of current poverty rates, there 
has been a resurgence in calls for implementa-
tion of a Canadian guaranteed income. But the 
idea is a controversial one; progressive activ-
ists, academics, and politicians disagree about 
the desirability and the practicality of a guar-
anteed income.
This report:
• Traces the history of guaranteed income 
proposals in Canada;
• Catalogues both the most common reasons 
supporting advocacy of a guaranteed 
income and the most telling concerns 
raised by the notion;
• Provides an overview of basic dimensions 
along which proposals for a guaranteed 
income differ and sets out models that 
capture much of the range of proposals in 
the current debate; and
Summary
• Suggests a number of other social 
welfare measures that should be central 
elements of any reform program, but that 
guaranteed income debates often ignore.
The term “guaranteed income” refers to a spe-
cific although broad category of social reform. 
As a starting place for discussion, the idea of a 
guaranteed income is used to signal reform pro-
posals that advocate some variant of an income 
benefit scheme in which the state provides a 
minimum level of basic income on a continu-
ing basis to every adult, irrespective of personal 
circumstances or need, with no or very few con-
ditions attached. 
Proponents of a guaranteed income cite a 
range of reasons supporting the idea:
• A fix to poverty;
• Liberty and individual opportunity;
• Social and democratic citizenship;
• Gender equality;
• Shared social ownership;
• A flexible and just labour market; and
• Environmental sustainability.
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out, although to different degrees depending 
upon the type of guaranteed income proposal 
under consideration. Traditionally, three con-
cerns predominate:
•	Work	disincentive	effect	— Receipt 
of a generous and unconditional benefit 
may mean some individuals will opt out of 
participation in the paid labour market.
•	Reciprocity	— An unconditional benefit 
will give significant public resources to 
individuals who may contribute nothing to 
society in return.
•	Cost — A substantial guaranteed income 
scheme may be too expensive to be 
politically acceptable or possible.
Added to these problems are additional ques-
tions about how guaranteed income proposals 
may reinforce the gendered division of labour and 
women’s economic, civil, and political subordina-
tion. Equally concerning are observations about 
how guaranteed income proposals lend support 
to regressive and unjust neo-liberal forms of so-
cial and economic organization. 
Practical implementation of a guaranteed in-
come may result in unacceptable political com-
promises, such as in inadequate benefit levels, 
partial implementation that forestalls more radi-
cal progressive change, and selective application 
to only the “deserving poor.”
The paper concludes by noting that poverty is 
more than the simple lack of financial resources. 
While absence of money is an essential feature 
of poverty, social exclusion as well as inadequate 
access to public goods, networks, and political 
capital are all part of a fuller notion of poverty. 
Such an understanding of poverty means that a 
range of measures will be key to effective wel-
fare reform, including:
• Enhanced collective provision of essential 
public goods;
• Labour market policy reform; and
• Public, affordable, and quality childcare.
No single overview model is representative of all 
proposals for a guaranteed income. Academic 
and political writing on the idea is vast. Three 
working models of guaranteed income proposals 
illustrate the range of proposals across the four 
criteria of universality, conditionality, adequacy, 
and integration. These models are:
1.	Minimalist-libertarian	model	— 
Strong universality and unconditionality of 
guaranteed income set at a low benefit level 
with minimal provision of other social 
goods and income support.
2.	Mixed	welfare	model	— Guaranteed 
income models that closely resemble 
existing social assistance (welfare) schemes 
with partial and conditional benefits, and a 
range of both benefit levels and integration 
with other social programs.
3.	Strong	basic	income	model	— Strong 
universality and unconditionality paired 
with more generous benefit levels and 
variable integration with other programs.
Models 1 and 3 incorporate a guaranteed income 
as a stand-alone program that is relatively dis-
tinct and prominent in the overall social welfare 
architecture. The general intent of Model 1 is to 
downsize the social welfare state, but also to keep 
the poor from starving. Model 3, on the other 
hand, includes proposals with more ambitious 
aims of redistributing wealth and establishing 
social solidarity. Both of these models are rela-
tively simple in design, but vary in terms of cost: 
Model 1 stipulates minimal benefit levels while 
Model 3 requires a relatively generous benefit. 
Model 2, on the other hand, seeks to guarantee 
a minimum level of income for all through a 
patchwork quilt of traditional income support 
programs paired with a more limited guaranteed 
income. Of course, no real proposal necessarily 
maps exactly onto any one model, but instead will 
mix and match different elements of each.
A number of straightforward concerns about 
the merit of the idea of a guaranteed income stand 
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ciety will certainly provide some form of in-
come security, this alone will not satisfy the 
full scope of collective and public responsi-
bility such a society bears for the welfare of 
its population. 
While the authors of this report conclude in 
somewhat different positions on the desira-
bility of a guaranteed income program, both 
strongly recognize that no single social pro-
gram alone will be adequate. While a just so-
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Canada has rates of poverty that belie the eco-
nomic health and wealth of this country. Pock-
ets of poverty persist for specific groups, and the 
duration, depth, and rate of their poverty is often 
shocking. Far too many individuals in Canada 
lack decent housing, adequate nutrition, and full 
participation in our social and economic life.
For decades now, commentators of all stripes 
have criticized the course of the Canadian in-
come security system. A spate of reports from 
various quarters—the academy, research insti-
tutes, community coalitions—have called for 
re-visioning of Canada’s income security sys-
tem. This has been coupled with the growing 
recognition of poverty and income inequality 
as immediate concerns. There is consensus that 
change is needed, but no agreement as to what 
that change should be.
In this report the authors explore the sub-
stantive merit and strategic appeal of a guar-
anteed income as one option for a fundamental 
re-thinking of current income support programs 
in Canada. The last five years have seen a resur-
gence in calls for a guaranteed income, partic-
ularly from anti-poverty and equality-seeking 
groups. In fact, the idea of a guaranteed income 
Introduction
has cycled through Canadian social policy de-
bates on a regular basis and has never been far 
below the political surface.
This discussion paper looks seriously at the 
suggestion of a guaranteed income and the chal-
lenges such a reform poses for traditional ways 
of thinking about income security issues in our 
country. A guaranteed income may indeed offer 
a valuable opportunity to move out of the “very 
well worn ruts” of welfare reform.1 Or, the idea 
may promise more than it can deliver. These are 
the questions we take up.
The analysis and conclusions in this paper are 
the result of ongoing conversation and collabo-
rative work on the idea of a guaranteed income 
by the co-authors. One of us (Young) is more of 
a sceptic and the other (Mulvale) more of a pro-
ponent of guaranteed income. Both, however, 
agree that the question of ensuring universal, 
unconditional, and adequate economic securi-
ty for all people in Canada is critical. We have 
learned much from each other, as well as from 
the academic literature, research data, and views 
of policy experts and community activists with 
whom we have engaged in the course of prepar-
ing this report.2
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We use the term “guaranteed income” to refer to 
a general category of proposals for a minimum 
level of income security for everyone in Cana-
da. We use this rather general term in order to 
be inclusive of the full range of policy proposals 
that are part of the debate around this approach 
to income security.
There are, of course, other commonly used 
labels—guaranteed annual income, citizen’s 
wage, guaranteed livable income, basic income, 
social dividend, territorial dividend, state bo-
nus, demogrant—that appear in debate and lit-
erature. Within English Canada, the most com-
mon term — despite a wide variance of detail in 
what is specifically meant — is Guaranteed An-
nual Income. Debates on this topic in Quebec 
have tended to use the French terms “l’allocation 
universelle” and “le revenu de citoyenneté.” In-
deed, it is a sign of the vigour and extent of the 
argument that such a range of terminology ex-
ists. We are faced with, as one commentator puts 
it, “certain imprecision when it comes to defi-
nition and a surplus of choice when it comes to 
terminology.”3
Consequently, providing an initial starting 
definition of a guaranteed income is tricky. How-
What is a Guaranteed Income?
ever, the following characteristics of a strong var-
iant of a guaranteed income are useful markers. 
At this point in our discussion, this definition is 
given to distinguish our subject from more com-
monplace and existing versions of income secu-
rity, such as provincial social assistance (welfare 
programs). More nuanced discussion of the range 
of proposals follows later in the report. 
The purest or strongest versions of guaran-
teed income proposals generally specify a floor 
or minimum level of core income provided on a 
continuing basis by the state, to which everyone 
is entitled irrespective of personal circumstances 
or need, subject to no or very few conditions of 
eligibility, such as work requirements. 
Under this model, an executive earning 
$150,000 would receive the same benefit as the 
minimum wage secretary sitting outside that ex-
ecutive’s office door, the unemployed but work-
seeking individual handing that secretary a job 
application, the at-home parent pushing twins in 
a stroller outside the office building, and the un-
employed person not looking for work who is sit-
ting at the café on the other side of the street.
But as we note repeatedly, there is great va-
riety among guaranteed income proposals with 
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both large and minor departures from the cen-
tral vision defined above. And, the line between 
traditional income security provision and guar-
anteed income proposals can blur, depending 
upon the details of each. Consequently, in the 
discussion that follows, we do provide a series 
of working models that categorize the range of 
different proposals at play in the debate. 
There is no full-fledged guaranteed income 
program in place anywhere in the world. A 
number of jurisdictions have programs that 
can be understood to be partial or fledgling 
guaranteed income schemes. For example, the 
Alaskan Permanent Fund Dividend, starting in 
1999, has paid to each adult resident of Alaska 
an annual “dividend.” These payments are on a 
small scale ($1,654 in 2007 for each applicant), 
but nonetheless have some features in common 
with more generous and full guaranteed income 
proposals.4 In Canada, some claim that our na-
tional Old Age Security/Guaranteed Income 
Supplement program, which ensures an annual 
income for all those over 65, is a form of guar-
anteed income.
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One Belgian observer of the debate over a guar-
anteed income has described the idea as “a wash-
ing powder that can be used in any washing ma-
chine,” from right to left.5 Multiple and sometimes 
contending versions make debate about guaran-
teed income varied, fascinating, and challeng-
ing. When endorsed simply as an appealing idea, 
many applaud the notion. But when the details 
of a guaranteed income program are up for de-
bate, the consensus weakens, often but not always 
along predictable ideological grounds. 
So what is the general appeal of an idea of a 
guaranteed income? The following arguments 
are made.
•	A	Fix	to	Poverty:	First, and most 
powerfully, a guaranteed income holds out 
the promise of alleviating (and perhaps 
even eradicating) poverty—at least poverty 
understood simply as lack of income. 
This helps to explain the attractiveness of 
guaranteed income in times of growing 
economic inequality and persistent poverty 
amidst affluence. 
•	A	Measure	of	Formal	Liberty	
and	Individual	Opportunity:	A 
The Idea and its General Appeal
guaranteed income proposal is not only 
and simply about ending poverty. The 
most powerful political arguments for 
a guaranteed income are animated by 
particular views of social justice, equality, 
and freedom. A guaranteed income, by 
providing a core income for all, is seen to 
promise equality of opportunity in society.6 
A guaranteed income, at an adequate level, 
allows an individual to realize for herself 
or himself the promises and opportunities 
that society offers.
•	A	Means	to	Social	and	Democratic	
Citizenship:	A guaranteed income is also 
touted as a way to ensure citizens can fulfil 
the civic duties we all carry as citizens. 
We cannot aspire to civic virtues when 
we are preoccupied with mere survival. 
Thus, an American political theorist, 
Carole Pateman, argues that the economic 
security a guaranteed income provides 
is instrumental to self-government in 
intimate spheres (the family), the labour 
market, and, more broadly, in democratic 
mechanisms of political government.7
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•	A	Key	to	Gender	Equality:	
Poverty often means reinforcement of 
discriminatory social and economic 
relations for women. For example, lack 
of income can force women to stay in 
abusive, unhealthy relationships with men. 
As well, the gendered division of labour, 
reflected in women’s disproportionate 
caregiving responsibilities, results in 
women’s more vulnerable status in the 
labour market. Income support programs 
that are conditional on specific patterns of 
(typically male) labour force involvement 
disadvantage women (and mothers, in 
particular). A guaranteed income, it is 
argued, encourages recognition of the full 
range of human activities, including unpaid 
caregiving work, that are key to a cohesive 
and rich society. An individual could make 
“real choices with reference to economic 
and non-economic activities.”8 Moreover, 
the universality and conditionality that 
a guaranteed income offers can make 
traditional scrutiny of welfare recipients 
unnecessary. The income security provided 
by guaranteed income, it is argued, could 
advance women’s economic and social 
citizenship and equality.
•	A	Recognition	of	Citizens’	Shared	
Social	Ownership:	Many see a 
guaranteed income as recognition of 
individual citizens’ shared ownership 
in the resources of a society. Fairness, it 
is argued, requires that a portion of the 
goods of a society—its collective wealth 
and resources—be shared with all who 
make up that society. The Alaska Dividend, 
for example, is paid out of the Alaska 
Permanent Fund, a fund created out of 
a percentage of the proceeds of mineral 
sales or royalties, and thus recognizes the 
ultimate “ownership” by residents of the 
products of the state. Closer to home, the 
one-time Alberta Prosperity cheque, paid 
out in January 2006 to every resident of 
Alberta over 18 years of age, was billed as a 
“resource rebate” to Alberta residents from 
the budget surpluses accumulated from the 
province’s resource-fuelled economy. 
•	A	More	Flexible	and	Just	Labour	
Market:	Proponents argue that a 
guaranteed income gives workers flexibility 
more suited to the new global market. A 
guaranteed income gives an individual 
a level of basic economic well-being 
independent of involvement in the paid 
labour force. This might mean a number 
of positive things. For example, workers 
with a guaranteed income in hand could 
choose to start up a business, work part-
time, job share, take a sabbatical, or 
take an interesting but lower paid job. A 
guaranteed income would “decommodify” 
labour by providing individuals with the 
ability to devote their energies to socially 
necessary and valuable forms of work 
that are not paid. It might also enhance 
the power of labour to bargain effectively 
with capital. For low wage, unattractive 
work, this may mean that workers will be 
able to leverage better working conditions 
or better pay. Thus a guaranteed income 
could prevent “desperation bidding” by 
workers with no other economic options.
•	A	More	Environmentally	
Sustainable	World:	Perhaps a system 
of income security with guaranteed 
income as its centrepiece could challenge 
conventional wisdom on the need for 
never-ending economic growth as the 
precondition of general prosperity and 
income security. Guaranteed income could 
ensure a modest but sustainable standard 
of living for all, in the context of a more 
“steady state” economy with lower levels 
of consumption but greater economic 
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the historical development of capitalist 
economies.
As outlined above, the benefits claimed for a 
guaranteed income are many and compelling. 
It is no surprise that the idea of a guaranteed 
income is resilient and resurgent.
redistribution. This scenario challenges 
the obsession in capitalist economies with 
open-ended accumulation and ever-rising 
levels of earned income and consumption 
of material goods. It also undermines 
“wage slavery” that has been central to 
canadian centre for policy alternatives12
The history of the idea of a guaranteed income 
in western thought is long and already well doc-
umented.9 In twentieth century Canada, more 
specifically, the idea of a guaranteed income of 
some sort has had resonance for a range of groups, 
at different times and in reference to different 
reform agendas. The following chronology sets 
out some of this historical background to cur-
rent debates. 
In 1933 a Social Credit government led by 
William Aberhart was elected in Alberta. Aber-
hart argued for regular cash payments made by 
the provincial government to all, as a means of 
economic stimulus and redistribution. But the 
promise of a “social credit” paid to all citizens 
proved difficult to implement, in part due to a 
lack of funds in the provincial treasury and op-
position from Ottawa. The plan ultimately ran 
afoul of judicial insistence that the federal gov-
ernment alone had constitutional control over 
currency and banking. Aberhart’s successor as 
Alberta Premier, Ernest Manning, officially aban-
doned Social Credit doctrine in 1944.
The next significant moment came during the 
1960s. In 1968 the Economic Council of Canada, 
a former federally funded crown corporation, 
The Contours (So Far)  
of the Guaranteed Income  
Debate in Canada
noted the presence of poverty in Canada “on a 
much larger scale than most Canadians proba-
bly suspect.”10 The idea of a guaranteed income 
emerged as one mechanism for addressing this 
newly acknowledged poverty. Indeed, 1967 had 
seen the introduction of the Old Age Security’s 
Guaranteed Income Supplement as an (initially 
assumed to be temporary) measure to reduce 
poverty among seniors. 
The Special Senate Committee on Poverty, 
chaired by Senator David Croll, was created in 
1968 to study poverty in Canada and recom-
mend effective policy measures to address the 
problem. The Committee’s 1971 report recom-
mended a guaranteed annual income financed 
and administered by the federal government, 
and delivered through a negative income tax. 
The Committee wrote that this proposal met 
three basic requirements: “it provides adequate 
income, it preserves the incentive to work, and it 
is fiscally possible.”11 The guaranteed annual in-
come was an idea, the Committee wrote, “whose 
time had come.”12 
The proposed guaranteed income would 
cover all Canadian citizens “who need it” (ex-
cluding those who were single, unattached, and 
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under the age of 40), and was to take the form 
of a negative income tax. It would provide a 
guaranteed income of 70 per cent of the poverty 
lines set by the Committee and would be paired 
with a 70 per cent reduction rate for each dollar 
of additional income earned. The basic tax ex-
emption was to be raised to the poverty level so 
that those receiving only the income guarantee 
would not pay taxes. 
The guaranteed income proposed by the Croll 
report provided an income of $3,500 for a family 
of four or the equivalent of roughly $19,224 in 
2008 dollars, adjusting for inflation. The report 
estimated the cost of such a scheme, for 1967, at 
$645 million (just over $4.1 billion in 2008). This 
amount represented around 1 per cent more of 
1967 GNP than existing income security costs.
The guaranteed income proposed in the Croll 
report would replace all federal income-mainte-
nance programs, with the exceptions of federal 
programs such as unemployment insurance, the 
Canada Pension Plan, and Veterans’ Allowances. 
Provincial governments would remain responsi-
ble for the provision of social services, with the 
Canadian Assistance Plan retained to provide for 
federal/provincial cooperation in the delivery of 
such services. In this way, individuals not covered 
under the guaranteed annual income would be 
provided for based on a needs test. 
The cost of this proposal was a significant 
hurdle to its acceptance. As well, critics focused 
on the issue of inadequate work incentives and 
the reduction rate. Earnings would have to be 
well above the benefit level for significant income 
enhancement to occur through paid work. The 
plan was never implemented. 
The Castonguay-Nepveu Commission, ap-
pointed by the Quebec government, followed in 
1971. The Commission recommended a three-tier 
income security plan for Quebec. The first tier 
consisted of a basic negative income tax called 
the General Social Allowances Plan (GSAP). The 
GSAP would replace existing Quebec social as-
sistance with two levels of benefit: one for the 
“employable” and another for the “not employ-
able.” Benefits for the employable would be 60 
per cent of benefits for the not employable. It 
was assumed that employable recipients would 
supplement their benefits with employment 
earnings.13
Around the same time the federal Department 
of National Health and Welfare wrote that the 
idea of a guaranteed income as an anti-poverty 
measure had potential, but needed further study 
and investigation.14
In 1970 the Royal Commission on the Sta-
tus of Women was established. The Commis-
sion recommended, among other things, that a 
“guaranteed annual income be paid by the fed-
eral government to the heads of all one-parent 
families with dependent children.”15 While ar-
guing that a guaranteed annual income would 
benefit all Canadians, the report nonetheless 
recommended that the program be at least ini-
tially targeted where the need was greatest: to 
single parents, specifically sole-support moth-
ers. The specific form of guaranteed annual in-
come recommended was a negative income tax 
scheme, joined with reduction of other federal 
and provincial income security schemes.
In 1973 a minority federal Liberal government 
initiated the Social Security Review, marked by 
the publication of the Working Paper on Social 
Security in Canada.16 Known as the Orange Pa-
per, the working paper argued for a two-tiered 
approach to social assistance, including a guar-
anteed annual income plan for those who could 
not work and an income supplement for the 
working poor. Ultimately, the review came to 
naught and folded in 1976. At this point, discus-
sion of guaranteed income receded from the gov-
ernment agenda for some time. Two Canadian 
economists, Derek Hum and Wayne Simpson, 
argue that the late 1970s were marked by preoc-
cupation with rising inflation, wage and price 
controls, and growing deficits, and were inhos-
pitable to engagement with the notion of guar-
anteed income.17
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there appeared to be little political support at any 
government level for a guaranteed income pro-
gram. The project resulted in no official findings, 
few results of the experiment were published, and 
much of the data collected remain archived to 
this day.19 Hum and Simpson attribute this out-
come to “mundane factors such as money, tim-
ing [and] changing policy preferences.”20
But by the mid-1980s the idea of a guaran-
teed income was back on the policy agenda, due 
primarily to the 1982 Royal Commission on the 
Economic Union and Development Prospects 
for Canada (Macdonald Commission).21 The 
1985 report from the Macdonald Commission 
was marked by general concern about econom-
ic efficiency and support for free market forces. 
Central among the number of reforms to the Ca-
nadian welfare system that were recommended 
was implementation of a Universal Income Se-
curity Program (UISP). The UISP was billed as 
bringing about reform that would be “radical, 
not cosmetic, and wholesale rather than tink-
ering at the margin.” The Commission point-
edly chose not to use the term “guaranteed an-
nual income” to describe this proposal, as the 
UISP had benefit levels considerably lower than 
those traditionally associated with guaranteed 
incomes. Nonetheless, the UISP stands as a guar-
anteed income proposal. The Macdonald Com-
mission’s recommendations with respect to the 
UISP were echoed a year after the report was re-
leased by the Forget Commission on Unemploy-
ment Insurance.22 
The Macdonald Commission proposed that 
the UISP would eventually replace much of the 
then existing welfare state, including the Guar-
anteed Income Supplement, family allowances, 
the refundable child tax credit, child and mari-
tal tax exemptions, federal social housing pro-
grams, federal transfers to the provinces for so-
cial assistance, and the income support functions 
of unemployment insurance. Old Age Security 
would be left intact with current levels of sup-
port. The UISP benefit itself would be financed 
Advocacy of guaranteed income programs, 
however, continued from a number of organiza-
tions inside the mainstream social policy com-
munity. For example, in 1976 the National Coun-
cil of Welfare, an advisory body to the Minister 
of Health and Welfare, released its Guide to the 
Guaranteed Income.18
One other interesting artefact from this pe-
riod remains. In 1974, a year after the start of 
the federal review of social security, the gov-
ernments of Canada and Manitoba signed an 
agreement to begin a trial run of a basic in-
come experiment, clearly linking the experi-
ment to the Social Security Review. Later that 
year a version of guaranteed annual income, 
the Manitoba Basic Guarantee Annual Income 
Experiment (dubbed “Mincome”) was piloted. 
While initially envisioned by at least the Mani-
toba government as a simple and relatively in-
expensive trial, Mincome evolved into a com-
plicated experiment, with a focus on the issue 
of whether or not a guaranteed income would 
provide a disincentive for recipients to engage 
in paid labour. 
The Mincome project involved 1,300 Manitoba 
families, from both urban and rural communi-
ties, and distributed these families randomly be-
tween a number of different guaranteed income 
plans and a control group for three years. Fami-
lies with incomes above a certain amount were 
excluded from the trials and those included in 
the study were assigned, in 1974 dollars, one of 
three support levels ($3,800, $4,800, $5,800) for 
a family of two adults and two children. Three 
different tax-back rates (the rate at which ben-
efit payments will be reduced for each dollar of 
additional income brought into the family) were 
used: 35 per cent, 50 per cent, and 75 per cent. 
The most generous combination ($5,800 bene-
fit and 35 per cent tax back) and least generous 
combination ($3,800 benefit and 75 per cent tax 
back) were not tested.
By 1979, the experiment was closed: the So-
cial Security Review was over and, as mentioned, 
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alize poverty, setting income security benefits 
for many at lower levels than even existing pro-
grams. The UISP also met with strong opposition 
from the Canadian labour movement.28 
While the Mulroney government imple-
mented the Commission’s recommendations for 
free trade, the UISP proposals were ignored by 
the government and, for many, the MacDonald 
Commission proposal has come to symbolize the 
dangers of guaranteed income proposals.
A discussion paper tabled in the House of 
Commons in 1994 by then Minister of Human 
Resources Lloyd Axworthy dismissed the idea of 
implementation of a formal guaranteed income 
program. The paper noted that Canada’s current 
mix of social assistance and tax credit programs 
was a “de facto guaranteed minimum income.”29 
The paper went on to argue against a specific 
guaranteed income program on the grounds of 
cost and effectiveness. A supplementary paper 
issued along with the discussion paper continues 
to be widely read and influential in the guaran-
teed income debate in Canada.30
Recent years have seen not only a revival of 
the idea of a guaranteed income in grassroots 
and civil society conversations, but a casting 
of the program in more radical form by many 
groups. In 2006, The Women’s Livable Income 
Working Group strongly argued for a guaranteed 
income in its Women’s Economic Justice Report, 
assembled from interviews with 44 “grassroots” 
women.31 In September 2004, feminists, activ-
ists, scholars and writers from across the coun-
try met in Pictou, Nova Scotia, and issued the 
Pictou Statement in which they called for “an 
indexed guaranteed living income for all indi-
vidual residents set at a level to enable comfort-
able living.”32 This endorsement of a guaranteed 
income has been echoed, to differing degrees, 
by a number of non-government organizations 
in various publications focusing on social wel-
fare reform.33
The idea of a guaranteed income also contin-
ues to pop up in the political arena. In 2000, then 
by a reallocation of expenditures for the elimi-
nated programs. Key to the Commission’s rec-
ommendation was their understanding that the 
reform would thus impose no extra cost and, 
indeed, might even save a considerable amount 
of money.
Unlike more traditional guaranteed income 
programs, the UISP was to have a relatively low 
guarantee level and a low reduction rate. The 
objective, the McDonald report notes, was pres-
ervation of work incentives with some income 
support.23 The report recommended a universal 
demogrant-based delivery system,24 rather than 
a strictly tax-based system, although argued 
that either would be effective. The report also 
recognized that a phasing in of the UISP would 
be required. 
The McDonald report acknowledged that the 
income guarantees proposed were not adequate 
to meet all family needs without additional sup-
port, a choice made deliberately to preserve work 
incentives. The report also assumed that pro-
vincial or municipal social assistance top-ups 
as a second tier of benefits would continue to 
be available for families with very little income. 
Benefits for young recipients would be contin-
gent upon an “active job search”25 and benefits 
for those between 18 and 35 might be restricted 
to half of the level for older recipients.26 Thus, 
the proposal was not a truly universal one. Ben-
efit levels and tax-back rates varied somewhat 
depending on age and family status. 
Criticism of the UISP came quickly and from 
a variety of directions. From the left, commenta-
tors pointed out that the UISP suffered from the 
Commission’s failure to acknowledge the con-
text of increasing unemployment and poverty, 
the dismantling of existing social programs, and 
growing income inequalities of the 1980s.27 In-
deed, the recommendations of the Commission 
adhered to conservative mainstream 1960s and 
70s traditions of thinking about guaranteed in-
come schemes. Critics were quick to point out 
that such a scheme would effectively institution-
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The 2008 federal election saw Elizabeth May’s 
federal Green Party support the idea of a “Guar-
anteed Livable Income.” The Green Party platform 
envisioned an incremental implementation of a 
guaranteed income initiated by a federal benefit of 
$5,000 to every individual on provincial welfare.
At the 2008 Congress of the Basic Income 
Earth Network (BIEN) in Dublin, Ireland, BIEN 
Canada was launched as a national chapter of the 
international group. Its objective is to promote 
awareness and informed debate about guaran-
teed income among activists, researchers, and 
politicians across the country.36 
The debate clearly continues.
Prime Minister Jean Chretien was rumoured to 
be considering a guaranteed income. In 2006, 
the Standing Senate Committee on Agriculture 
and Forestry released an interim report in which 
a guaranteed income was touted as a possible 
means of reducing rural poverty.34 Hugh Segal, 
a Conservative member of Canada’s Senate, has 
considerable visibility as an advocate for a guar-
anteed income. While he would retain special 
programs for the aged, disabled and for educa-
tion and health care, his proposal for a guar-
anteed income would collapse other programs 
into a basic living income offered in the form of 
negative income tax.35 
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Academic and political literature on the idea of 
a guaranteed income is vast. No single overview 
model is representative of all ideas for a guaranteed 
income. In this section we elaborate, first, several 
basic dimensions along which the proposals vary 
and, second, three basic models that can be situated 
along these dimensions that reflect the debate. 
Basic Dimensions to Guaranteed Income 
Proposals
Four criteria characterize and distinguish guar-
anteed income proposals: 
• Degree of universality of eligibility; 
• Degree of conditionality of entitlement; 
• Adequacy of benefit level; and 
• Integration with other social programs.37 
Universality
Tight definitions of universality and condition-
ality are impossible—the two terms are used 
elastically and often interchangeably. Ques-
tions about one often shape conclusions about 
the other. Yet each captures an important and 
distinct policy dimension. 
Dimensions and Models of 
Guaranteed Income Proposals
The question of universality refers to the 
range of the general population that is, as an 
initial starting point, covered by the policy. The 
more universal a benefit is, the more general 
and widespread its potential distribution across 
the population will be. More selective policies 
single out smaller subsets of the population for 
coverage. As a strongly universal benefit, a spe-
cific guaranteed income policy would provide 
for every individual adult member of society, 
irrespective of income levels. For example, ac-
ademics Sally Lerner, Charles Clark and Rob-
ert Needham have argued for a Basic Income 
system that employs a notion of universality 
that dictates payment of benefits to every Ca-
nadian citizen or permanent resident.38 Few, if 
any, proposals for a guaranteed income argue 
for complete universality—generally citizenship 
(or residency) and age feature in some way to 
exclude some individuals or groups. Some pro-
posals have a kind of differential universality: 
for example, adults might receive larger benefits 
than children.
The broad universality of many guaranteed 
income schemes makes the issues of cost and 
distributional equity significant features of 
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how the benefit payment is spent, or beneficiar-
ies’ social living arrangements. Notably, recipi-
ents of such an unconditional guaranteed income 
would have no requirements of labour force in-
volvement or availability, labour skills training, 
or job seeking. As we discuss later, the uncon-
ditionality (or limited conditionality) of most 
guaranteed income proposals stands as one of 
the most significant political obstacles to general 
acceptance of guaranteed income reforms. On 
the other hand, monitoring and enforcing par-
ticipation as a condition of receiving guaranteed 
income adds to administrative complexity and 
expense of delivering the program, and may be 
an intrusive, punitive, and stigmatizing experi-
ence for those receiving benefits.
Unconditionality and universality, it is argued, 
could be combined to cast guaranteed income 
as a basic entitlement of membership in Cana-
dian society. Such a benefit could be seen as a 
right of citizenship, as important as (for exam-
ple) the right to vote. 
Adequacy
Proposals vary greatly in terms of the amount 
of money that should be paid as a guaranteed 
income benefit. Some proposed levels exceed, 
others fall considerably short of, what might be 
commonly conceived as adequate. A guaran-
teed income is understood variably as a small 
“top-up” to other sources of income, as a partial 
income, or as a fully livable income. Notably, a 
number of current Canadian proposals argue 
for a “guaranteed adequate income,” thereby 
indicating a benefit level that permits a decent 
level of income. 
Proposals also vary in terms of form and 
duration of benefit provision. Policy proposals 
might envision a regular income stream (where 
payments are received on a weekly, monthly, even 
yearly basis), or benefits that have a time limit on 
eligibility (say three or five years). Some guaran-
teed income plans consider regional variation in 
benefit level. Clearly, costs of living are higher 
the political debate. As the breadth of cover-
age widens towards universality, of course, the 
up-front cost of providing a guaranteed income 
rises. This may achieve greater coverage (eve-
ryone gets something), but it also raises issues 
of vertical economic distribution because the 
wealthy receive the same benefit as individuals 
at lower income levels. While a progressive tax-
back rate can correct the regressive impact of 
such coverage, the optics of providing benefits 
to those who do not need them along with the 
initial budgetary impact of such universality 
may make it politically difficult to have a ben-
efit level that is significant in alleviating and 
reducing poverty. 
In considering universality, there is also 
the question of whether payments should be 
made to individuals or to household units, or 
to both at different levels. Most proposals pro-
vide for direct payments to individuals, citing 
reasons of individual liberty in lifestyle choice 
and administrative ease. Concerns about gen-
der equality feature strongly in favour of a more 
individualised approach. Proponents of paying 
benefits to households, on the other hand, cite 
concerns of general equity in relation to the 
economies of scale that larger households can 
achieve, and of the need for consistency with 
existing household-focused programs. This lat-
ter approach, of course, involves the contentious 
task of defining what is or is not considered to 
be a “household.”
Conditionality
Conditionality sets out the kind of conditions that 
are built into a policy that may limit the eligibility 
of a person otherwise covered by the program. 
Most existing income security programs have 
a number of conditions that recipients need to 
satisfy in order to gain and maintain eligibility. 
Guaranteed income proposals are distinctive in 
that they typically claim to be (at least mostly) 
unconditional. For example, an unconditional 
guaranteed income policy would be neutral as to 
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A brief discussion of each of the three models 
follows.
1.	Minimalist-libertarian	Model
This model stipulates a base income guaranteed 
to all adult residents, with no conditions at-
tached. However, the benefit is set at an income 
level unlikely to raise individuals out of poverty. 
The concern is to protect a paid work incentive. 
In this model, guaranteed income tends to be 
paired with elimination of most other income 
support programs and public services now of-
fered by federal and provincial government. 
Thus, this model is premised on strong univer-
sality and unconditionality. But it has weak ad-
equacy and is not integrated with other means 
of income security and the provision of public 
goods. It extends the income guarantee widely 
and easily, but is informed by a political philos-
ophy of individual responsibility and limited 
government. It is often premised on arguments 
for radical downsizing of the welfare state and 
of labour market regulations such as minimum 
wage laws. The Macdonald Commission pro-
posal is an illustration of this type. So too is the 
proposal from right-wing American economist 
Milton Friedman for an income security scheme 
targeted at low-income people delivered through 
a “negative income tax” mechanism.39 
2.	Mixed	Welfare	Model	
This category represents those proposals that 
blend the existing system of income security and 
the notion of a guaranteed income. 
Guaranteed income proposals in this model 
are partial and typically extended to a smaller 
subset of the population, based on variables such 
as age, income level, and labour market partici-
pation. So, they are not fully universal. These 
proposals also vary in terms of how adequate or 
unconditional the benefit is. A key characteristic 
is the mix of income security measures. Joined 
with a qualified guaranteed income program are 
partial income security for some groups, through 
in some areas of Canada – in large cities, for ex-
ample – than in other regions. A single benefit 
level ignores this variability. 
Integration
A key question is how much a guaranteed income 
proposal is integrated with other income support 
programs and the provision of “in kind” public 
goods such as health care and social housing. 
Some proponents of a guaranteed income 
endorse a guaranteed income as replacement 
for most other income security programs (such 
as unemployment insurance, social assistance, 
and public pensions). Other proposals envision 
a guaranteed income program that is comple-
mented by a number of other publicly provided 
income supports, services and goods. Obviously, 
if and how guaranteed income is integrated with 
other social and income support programs will 
affect its ultimate cost.
Three Working Models for Guaranteed 
Income
As we have already noted, there is no one sin-
gle representative model that captures the full 
scope of what has been proposed as a guaran-
teed income. 
For purposes of further discussion and de-
bate we have generated three general models that 
identify some important themes and variations 
in application of the four criteria set out above—
universality, conditionality, adequacy, and inte-
gration. The three models that we set out here 
are “ideal types.” Actual proposals may blend 
and mix aspects from more than one of these 
working models. But these three models help 
to map the terrain of policy debate and choices 
in regard to guaranteed income.
The three models we identify are: 
• Minimalist-libertarian model;
• Mixed welfare model; and,
• Strong basic income model.
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(e.g. caring for children at home), uncondition-
ality is weaker. An example of a proposal at this 
more generous end of the scale is contained in 
the 2006 Caledon Institute report Towards a New 
Architecture for Canada’s Adult Benefits. The re-
port argues for an income-tested, long-term, ad-
equate basic income for individuals who cannot 
reasonably be expected to work.40
3.		Strong	Basic	Income	or	Guaranteed	
Adequate	Income	Model
This model stipulates that a guaranteed income 
should provide the material basis for “real free-
dom for all” through a significant redistribution 
of wealth. Proposals of this type seek to elimi-
nate poverty and ensure a universal and uncon-
ditional liveable income. 
This model has a number of key elements. 
First, the benefit is paid by the state out of pub-
licly controlled resources to every individual 
(or household unit), regardless of the income or 
wealth of that individual (or household unit). 
The payment would be in cash and would have 
no restrictions as to how it is spent. It would be 
paid on a regular basis, say every month. Sec-
ond, all members of a given society would re-
ceive the income, although what is meant by 
members can vary. Some think of membership 
as restricted to legal citizens; most proponents, 
however, conceive of membership in a broader 
sense that includes all legal permanent residents. 
Third, the payment is unconditional: no means 
test or work requirement would accompany it. 
Fourth, the level of income guaranteed is formu-
lated to lift each individual recipient’s income 
above the poverty line or some other indicator 
of adequacy or liveability.
One of the best-known advocates in the cur-
rent debate, Belgian scholar Philippe Van Parijs, 
argues for such a version of guaranteed income.41 
Van Parijs argues that this variant of guaranteed 
income “is a profound reform that belongs in the 
same league as the abolition of slavery or the in-
troduction of universal suffrage.”42 
existing discretionary, means-tested income sup-
port programs (especially provincial social as-
sistance programs), and less stigmatizing, con-
tributory social insurance programs (such as 
Employment Insurance and the Canada/Quebec 
Pension Plans). Thus, this model is strong on in-
tegration of a limited guaranteed income with 
other income security programs.
Within this general model some proposals are 
more minimalist and severe in terms of income 
security guarantees, with a stronger emphasis on 
paying out benefits only to those who “deserve” 
them, and as a supplement (rather than a partial 
or full replacement) of the income that everyone 
is expected to earn in the labour market. These 
proposals concern themselves with “activation” 
policies to encourage participation in the paid 
labour market. Guaranteed income elements of 
these proposals are thus often characterized by 
low benefits, a limited number of recipients and 
frequent linkage to paid work—they have weak 
adequacy, reduced universality, and varied con-
ditionality elements. However, integration with 
other income security measures of a more tradi-
tional and individualistic sort is high.
Other proposals in this category take a wid-
er and more generous approach. For example, a 
mixed-welfare proposal may stipulate long-term, 
adequate, and non-stigmatizing income benefits to 
persons not expected to participate in the labour 
market (e.g. the elderly and persons with serious 
disabilities), paired with short-term, emergency 
assistance for other individuals, along with ex-
tended coverage and higher benefit levels for pro-
grams such as unemployment insurance. Thus, 
some categories of people are given guaranteed 
support through allowances that are independ-
ent of labour-market participation, while others 
are not. Thus, elements of universality and ad-
equacy are stronger, and income support is seen 
as linked with the collective provision of social 
goods. But because guaranteed income is often 
linked to “legitimate” disqualification from work 
or participation in some non-market form of work 
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is available to everyone but a reciprocity norm 
dictates that recipients must be engaged in either 
paid work or some form of socially necessary or 
useful work (for example, household or care work 
in the home, artistic production, or volunteer la-
bour in the community). Thus universality and 
conditionality are paired in this variant.
The Stakeholder’s Grant Variant
The stakeholder’s grant idea has historic roots in 
the writings of Thomas Paine44. More recently 
two American scholars, Bruce Ackerman and 
Anne Alstott, have proposed a Universal Basic 
Capital whereby a considerable payment is made 
to each individual on a one-off basis, for exam-
ple, at the beginning of adulthood.45 Some pro-
posals call for the development of an account or 
grant where use of funds is restricted to a range 
of specific purposes, such as advanced education 
or launching a new business. 
The result is a model that has the features 
of strong universality and unconditionality, but 
that is also paired with a high level of adequa-
cy. Integration with other elements of income 
security and welfare is variable—the model is 
sometimes postulated as replacing most other 
income security programs and other times pro-
posed as an addition to continuing provision of 
some other programs for both income security 
and public goods. Some advocates further ar-
gue for deregulation of the labour market as 
companion policy to a strong guaranteed in-
come program, thus pairing this robust ver-
sion of guaranteed income with a strengthened 
free market.43 
The Participation Income Variant
A variant of this model of guaranteed income 
is the idea of a “participation income.” In these 
sorts of proposals, the guaranteed income benefit 
An Aside on Delivery Mechanisms:  
Universal Demogrant or Negative Income Tax?
All of these models assume that a guaranteed income program could be delivered either through 
a universal demogrant or through a negative income tax. 
A universal demogrant involves an up-front payment, typically tax-free, to all (adult) citizens. Thus, 
it is paid regardless of income level, in the same amount to all individuals with no reduction rate. 
Most universal demogrant proposals stipulate that all other income is taxable, and typically at a 
rate higher than current income tax rates. Indeed, many proponents argue for a flat tax rate on 
all other income, although this is not an inevitable feature of universal demogrant programs. 
A negative income tax provides, through the device of a tax credit, a cash benefit to families 
or individuals with no or low income. A family or individual is guaranteed to reach at least the 
minimum cash benefit income level. Payment is reduced by a “tax back” rate for every dollar 
of additional income received. Once the recipient reaches a certain level of income, the benefit 
reduces to zero. Thus, under a negative income tax scheme there are three groups of benefit 
recipients: those receiving full benefits, those receiving partial benefits, and those receiving no 
benefits. Unlike a demogrant, a negative income tax is paid out selectively and involves consider-
ably less “up front” budgetary spending. 
Of course, the initial spending of a demogrant can be recouped through the tax system, should 
tax structures be so calibrated. A demogrant also advances money to those who need it in the 
present moment, while a negative income tax (unless structured to allow advance application) 
makes recipients wait for payment contingent upon the “income test” represented by a tax filing. 
The negative income tax is thus less responsive to the immediate contingences of low-income 
economic life.
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There is much that is compelling about a guar-
anteed income, as we have already signalled. But 
a number of concerns stand out, both straight-
forward concerns about the merits of the idea 
itself, and cautions about the pragmatic dangers 
of implementation. Both types of concerns are 
discussed below.
The Merits of the Idea Itself
The characteristics of universality and uncondi-
tionality, key to what is attractive and distinctive 
about a guaranteed income, also provide a focus 
for a series of critiques—particularly the three 
traditional and perennial concerns of work in-
centives, reciprocity, and cost.
Work	Incentives
Someone in receipt of a generous uncondition-
al benefit may no longer wish to work. This may 
be particularly true if work is tiresome and low 
paying and the recipient decides that the com-
bination of leisure time and guaranteed income 
is preferable to whatever the additional benefits 
of paid work might be. 
Critique of the Idea
The issue of work incentive is represented 
in the debate by the image of the Malibu surfer, 
quick to use the guaranteed income benefit to 
quit work and spend the days on the beach. If 
large numbers of individuals opt out of paid work 
to live on their guaranteed incomes, economic 
productivity and growth may be imperilled.
Proponents of guaranteed income have a range 
of responses. They argue, as we have already noted, 
that a guaranteed income is actually facilitative 
of more creative, flexible, and productive involve-
ment in a greater variety of work and paid labour. 
Moreover, guaranteed income experiments, such 
as the Manitoba Mincome program discussed 
earlier,46 showed only modest work disincentive 
effects.47 Such a small effect on work incentives 
is not particularly economically significant—al-
though it may certainly be politically significant 
for those who oppose a guaranteed income. 
Connected to concerns about labour force in-
volvement are criticisms that a guaranteed income 
will amount to no more than simple employer 
subsidization and an incentive for employers to 
reduce workers’ wages. The historic example in 
England over 200 years ago, the Speenhamland 
system, is frequently used (although not without 
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significant debate48) to argue that a guaranteed 
income may result in worsened exploitative con-
ditions in the labour market, especially a lower-
ing of wages to below subsistence levels. Some 
advocates argue this is good, allowing “contin-
ued participation of low earners in paid work.”49 
Nonetheless, a guaranteed income, from this an-
gle, looks too much like a subsidy to employers 
and an incentive to low wages. 
Reciprocity
The freeloading surfer that haunts the debate 
also symbolizes a second concern. Why pay the 
lazy, critics ask. Providing a guaranteed income 
to individuals who choose not to “work”—either 
in the paid labour market or in community en-
hancing activities—offends the moral principle 
of reciprocity. At a minimum, it is argued, indi-
viduals have a duty to work according to their 
abilities. To receive something for nothing is 
unjust. From this perspective, the decoupling 
of income from contribution simply encourages 
parasitism. Rather than being a significant step 
towards de-commodification and engaged com-
munity involvement, guaranteed income is seen 
by some as the ultimate “passive benefit.”50 
Advocates, like Van Parijs, point out the par-
tiality of the complaint. A guaranteed income 
recipient may get something she or he has not 
earned, but so too does the idle heiress or talented 
hockey player who, from undeserved good luck, 
benefits from the current unequal distribution 
of wealth, income, ability, and leisure. Why deny 
others a modest share of “undeserved gifts”? 
But, this is not necessarily a convincing answer 
and the moral concern of reciprocity and desert 
remains a significant challenge to the theory and 
public acceptability of a guaranteed income.
Cost
Any version of guaranteed income — whether 
universal or targeted, delivered as a demogrant 
or through negative income tax — obviously in-
volves substantial government spending. Rais-
ing taxes is politically unpopular. So committing 
substantial public revenue to ensure basic eco-
nomic security for all is seen by many as beyond 
the realm of the “reasonably discussable.” 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to examine 
some preliminary work done to estimate the 
actual budgetary cost of a program of guaran-
teed income. Lerner, Clark and Needham51 have 
presented a hypothetical model of a guaranteed 
income for Canada that would be paid as a uni-
versal grant to all citizens and permanent resi-
dents. They calculated the cost of a scheme that, 
in 1999, would pay the very modest income of 
$7,000 per year to persons age 65 and over, $5,000 
to persons aged 21 to 64, $3,000 to persons un-
der 21 (paid to the primary caregiver), and an 
additional $5,000 paid to each household, to be 
divided equally among adult members of the 
household. The total cost of this scheme was es-
timated to be $198.6 billion in 1999 dollars. This 
guaranteed income program would replace fed-
eral benefits for elderly persons and children, as 
well as Employment Insurance benefits for the 
unemployed. Subtracting these savings, the net 
cost of their scheme was calculated as $161.7 bil-
lion in 1999 dollars (or $200.3 billion in 2009 dol-
lars). As a point of comparison, the total federal 
government revenue for fiscal year 2008/09 was 
projected to be $241.9 billion. 
In 1994 Human Resources Development 
Canada (hrdc) considered the cost of guaran-
teed income options delivered both as a univer-
sal demogrant and through a negative income 
tax. The universal demogrant option would re-
quire the expenditure of an additional $93 bil-
lion ($124 billion in 2009 dollars) and would pay 
a benefit level that would be far from “livable.” 
On the other hand, the hrdc paper projected 
that the negative income tax option (costing a 
total of $37.3 billion) would be “cost-neutral.” It 
could be financed by savings in other programs 
such as unemployment insurance, the child tax 
benefit, and federal contributions towards so-
cial assistance. 
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Hum and Simpson estimate that their Basic 
Income would be very expensive, in one scenario 
costing $217.1 billion, compared to $75.8 in ex-
isting transfer payments to individuals from the 
federal government (in the year 2000). On the 
other hand, Hum and Simpson estimate the cost 
of their (more modest) Guaranteed Income to be 
much less and argue that it could reduce poverty 
more efficiently than their Basic Income model. 
Hum and Simpson, the Canadian economists 
whose work we have already discussed, model 
the cost of several variations of what they desig-
nate as “Basic Income” (a universal, non-taxable 
benefit set at the poverty line so as to eliminate 
poverty, at least in principle) and “Guaranteed 
Income” (that would be paid out as a universal 
benefit set below the poverty line, coupled with 
a tax-back rate on earned income).52 
table 1    What would a Guaranteed Income program cost in Canada?
Cost of possible GI programs (population data 2006):
Grants paid to individuals 
Program Cost (billions)
Grant of $15,000 per year paid to all individuals age 18 and over $392
Grant of $7,000 per year paid to all individuals age 18 and over $153
Grant of $15,000 per year for only ages 18 to 64 $327
Grant of $15,000 per year to individuals age 18 and over, plus a demogrant of  
$4,000 per year for each child under 18
$418
 
Grants paid to households 
Program Cost (billions)
Grant paid to households based on household size, where the value of the grant is equal 
to the LICO for a mid-sized city (2001 data)
$250
Payments only to individuals and families below the poverty line to bring them up to the 
LICO (i.e. reduction of poverty to zero) (2003 data)
$21.5
 
Cost of existing income security programs (2005) 
Program Cost (billions)
Old Age Supplement $29
Child Tax Benefit $9
Employment Insurance $14
GST and other tax credits $15
Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan $32
Provincial payments to individuals (e.g. income assistance) $32 
Local payments to individuals $3 
Total transfers to persons $135 
Basic personal tax exemption (foregone revenue) $26 
Age and spousal tax deductions (foregone revenue) $3 
Total cost of tax deductions $29 
Total transfers to persons ($135b) plus tax expenditures on basic personal & age/
spousal deductions ($29b), minus CPP/QPP as a contributory pension scheme ($32b)
$132
Note: The numbers in these charts are intended to give a general idea of what costs are involved in economic security programs, including possible GI 
programs. Most numbers are taken from analysis conducted by Marc Lee, economist at the CCPA. The numbers are approximate.
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year was $16.3 billion in both cash and tax points, 
although this figure included support for both 
post-secondary education and social assistance. 
Statistics Canada calculates that, in 2006/07, 
the total amount of spending on all social serv-
ices (including both income support and direct 
service to persons) by all levels of government 
in Canada was $172.4 billion.56 
It thus appears that a full-fledged version of 
guaranteed income is out of our immediate finan-
cial reach. It is also interesting to note, however, 
that a large majority of Canadians believe that the 
growing gap between the rich and the poor must 
be narrowed, and that higher taxes and closing 
tax loopholes for the wealthy are acceptable ways 
of doing so.57 There is also a large amount of re-
search evidence concerning the indirect costs of 
poverty and economic inequality in our country 
in sectors such as health care, criminal justice, 
and education. Finally, there is a green argument 
that we can no longer support the environmen-
tal costs of premising income support and eco-
nomic redistribution on economic expansion 
and growth.58 It will be interesting to see if such 
broader calculations of the costs of not having a 
guaranteed income scheme will be factored into 
debates about the affordability and feasibility of 
guaranteed income as time goes on.
In one Guaranteed Income scenario, they peg 
the cost at $37.8 billion.53 
For purposes of this ccPA report, some cost 
estimation was carried out on guaranteed in-
come dispersed as a demogrant, paid to either 
individuals or households (see Table 1). The most 
adequate version of guaranteed income in this 
model (a grant of $15,000 per year to all persons 
age 18 and over, and $4,000 per year for those 
under 18) is estimated to cost $418 billion. Cur-
rent costs in 2005 of existing income security 
programs were $132 billion,54 meaning that the 
net cost of this relatively generous guaranteed 
income option would be $286 billion,55 using 
the 2005 figure (or $311 billion in 2009 dollars). 
One can also calculate the cost of less expensive 
options, including a grant to households rather 
than individuals that would cost $250 billion 
(minus unspecified savings in other areas), and 
a targeted benefit to all poor individuals and 
households (that would in principle eliminate 
poverty) that would cost $21.5 billion.
To put the above figures in context, federal 
government spending in 2006/07 on direct trans-
fers to persons was $55.6 billion ($30.3 billion for 
the elderly, $14.1 billion to the unemployed, and 
$11.2 billion for children). Additionally, the total 
Canada Social Transfer to provinces in the same 
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Two other sets of issues about the merits of a 
guaranteed income are important to mention. 
First, it is of course true that strong guaranteed 
income proposals sit in opposition to the more 
punitive and minimal income security system the 
neo-liberal state tolerates. Yet, ironically a guar-
anteed income program that neglects or rejects 
inclusion with other forms of income assistance 
and the provision of public goods can reinforce 
the individualism and market focus of neo-lib-
eralism. Second, while feminist support for a 
guaranteed income holds centre stage, particu-
larly at the community level in Canada, there are 
also prominent feminist critiques of the notion. 
These issues are briefly discussed below. 
Ideological Resonance
A guaranteed income program requires the state to 
redistribute income more broadly and more fairly. 
However, emphasis on a guaranteed income alone 
as the centrepiece of social welfare provision may 
divert attention from the unjust workings of the 
market – both the market’s provision of services 
and its treatment of workers. A reform program 
that does little else than put some money into eve-
ryone’s pockets is unlikely to achieve an adequate 
Other Issues
re-distribution of social and economic resources. 
Indeed, if a guaranteed income is also used as an 
excuse or reason to cancel other forms of social 
spending and social programming—as some right 
wing advocates of the plan envision—the overall 
distributive effect of guaranteed income imple-
mentation may be regressive and less just.
Guaranteed income proposals may also risk 
over-emphasizing the importance of private ac-
tion and ignoring the roles that public respon-
sibility, public provision, and public ordering of 
community institutions can play in securing in-
dividual and community welfare. For example, 
many advocates of a guaranteed income point 
to the possibilities for involvement in volunteer 
community work that a guaranteed income al-
lows.59 Yet, community infrastructure surely is 
critical enough to warrant adequate financial sup-
port from the state. It is great to have community 
centres with an active volunteer corps, but surely 
it is even better to have community centres with 
adequate, trained, and (well) paid staff. 
Some models of a guaranteed income, par-
ticularly those that have minimal integration of 
the guaranteed income into a wider scheme of 
income and social benefits, imply that the remedy 
to poverty is simply individual and fiscal; struc-
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tural remedies are not necessarily envisioned or 
encompassed. But a guaranteed income, alone, 
cannot redress or alter structural problems re-
sponsible for poverty and disempowerment in 
Canadian society.
Moreover, the most simple guaranteed income 
proposals implicitly cast citizenship primarily in 
terms of the citizen as consumer, empowered by 
that citizenship to purchase social welfare needs 
in the market. This is consistent with what one 
commentator calls “elite neo-liberalism,” focusing 
on the “individual liberties of a mass consum-
erist society.”60 Public expectations about what 
ought to be collectively provided are decreased 
accordingly, and community is corroded.61 
Social welfare goods cannot be provided ad-
equately by the private market alone. Many such 
goods require collective, public provision — like 
medical care, social insurance, education, child 
care, social housing, and so on. No matter how 
adequate a guaranteed income is, there will still 
be services and goods that individuals will need 
— and that any just society would not see them 
go without — that income spent in the private 
market cannot guarantee.62 
The idea that economic and social needs can 
be best met by a universally established guar-
anteed income that delivers (roughly) the same 
amount to everyone also ignores that some in-
dividuals and groups have significantly different 
and more extensive needs, and ought therefore 
to have greater and different entitlements than 
would be provided by a standard universal ben-
efit.63 For example, a universal and fixed grant for 
health care would over-insure some and under-
insure others. Reform to the welfare state must 
recognize that key areas of human welfare re-
quire more that equal allotments of cash. 
Women 
There is a gendered face to poverty. Women rely 
significantly more than men upon a variety of state 
provided income and social assistance programs. 
Moreover, the issues of work and income that a 
guaranteed income invokes have strong relevance 
for women, given gender stereotypes and norms 
that structure the division of labour in Canadian 
society in ways that disadvantage women.
A guaranteed income may be an attractive policy 
for women whose caregiving work is undervalued 
and not economically supported. However, it may 
also threaten to reinforce the gendered division of 
labour, making it more difficult for women to choose 
the mix of unpaid caregiving and labour market 
employment that is individually optimal. Simply 
assuming that it is ideal for women to be free to 
choose to do unpaid caregiving work ignores the 
positive aspects of choosing not to do such work. 
It too often understates the critical role paid work 
plays in social inclusion and community building 
for individual women. Women risk not being able 
to assert the desire to work outside of the home 
once an income is available that economically al-
lows them to stay out of the paid labour force. 
Simply put, a guaranteed income might result 
in further institutionalization of women’s location 
within the family—the “domestic labour trap,”64 
reinforcing the gendered division of labour in the 
family and eroding women’s access to the job mar-
ket and careers. The result is a failure to liberate 
women from the very social assumptions and hi-
erarchy that construct the domestic characteriza-
tion and devaluation of women’s work in the first 
place.65 A guaranteed income may mean an increase 
in leisure and self-development opportunities for 
some, but it is unlikely that those individuals will 
be mothers with young children.
In sum, the worry is that some versions of 
guaranteed income lend support, perhaps un-
knowingly or unintentionally, to the gendered 
division of labour, an under-emphasis on pub-
lic citizenship and substantive equality, and a 
shrinking of public service provision. There is 
much that is libratory in aspirations of liberal 
economic individualism and the formal equality 
that underpins it, but one also must be cautious 
to avoid promoting such an ideal uncritically. 
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We turn now to the issues of political saleability 
and feasibility — the pragmatic considerations of 
bringing about an actual and adequate guaran-
teed income program in Canada. Largely, these 
are issues of political power, and in particular 
what vision of the Canadian welfare state will be 
supported by those elected to govern. 
We are at an interesting moment: what is po-
litically possible may be shifting. The discredit-
ing of free market economics and growing sen-
sitivity to the environmental disaster that lurks 
around the corner have recast public perceptions 
of what we must expect from government. And 
Canadians, according to a number of studies, 
want poverty addressed with clear and effective 
government policies for poverty reduction.66 That 
said, political hurdles remain.
As discussed above, the political resonances 
of certain versions of guaranteed income with 
neoliberalism and traditional gendered notions 
of labour should make us cautious. Compro-
mise in implementation of any program is inevi-
table, and we must be wary of what this might 
mean for a guaranteed income in practice. This 
results in a number of specific issues of prag-
matic concern.
Political Strategies and Feasibility
Benefit Level
Because it will be difficult to sell the idea of a 
guaranteed income that grants a truly adequate 
income, for the reasons of cost and reciprocity 
discussed above, the amount of the benefit is likely 
to be subject to political compromise. This risks 
what Ackerman and Alstott have characterized 
as the “chump change” problem — that benefits 
under any guaranteed income that is political-
ly feasible will be inadequate and ineffective in 
bringing about real change.67 The problem of 
poverty will be touted as having been fixed, but 
the reality will be that the poor will be less vis-
ible or credible as objects of political concern and 
attention. We must be careful not to lose sight 
of the motivating goal—the alleviation and, ul-
timately, elimination of poverty.
Gradual Implementation
Many thoughtful proponents of a guaranteed 
income see a strategy of gradual implementa-
tion — an initially modest but universal guar-
anteed income whose benefit level grows as the 
public gets used to the idea — as answer to the 
tricky issue of cost.68 But a limited version of 
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guaranteed income could very well justify on-
going or even accelerated dismantling of other 
social welfare programs. Already existing pub-
licly provided income security benefits might 
be folded into the guaranteed income, and pub-
licly provided goods and services (such as child-
care) might lose political viability. The outcome 
could be the worst of both worlds: an inadequate 
guaranteed income, and reduction or continued 
non-provision of many other aspects of the so-
cial welfare state. 
Another variant of staged, partial implemen-
tation involves compromising the notion of uni-
versality. Guaranteed incomes could be granted 
to different select groups of individuals in need. 
Such a program of guaranteed income would 
not be universal to all adults, say, but would be 
unconditionally guaranteed to those members 
of some designated sub-group of the popula-
tion. Canada’s current Old Age Security plan is 
an example of such a more selective but uncon-
ditional income security program. The Child 
Tax Benefit, introduced in 1984, was at one time 
touted as the seed for an eventual form of guar-
anteed income for families with children. And 
some form of guaranteed income for persons 
with disabilities circulates in and out of various 
current policy discussions. 
Not surprisingly, those welfare recipients 
deemed most “undeserving” — single, employ-
able adults without children — do not feature 
largely in proposals for more limited versions of a 
guaranteed income. And this fact highlights the 
danger that the rhetoric and justifications for a 
guaranteed income could be used to reinforce, 
rather than dismantle, the punitive and damag-
ing stereotypes already in play in existing wel-
fare programs about who deserves public sup-
port and who does not. The needs of only some 
of the poor will appear to merit attention.
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This paper has illustrated some of the promise, 
complexity, and challenges of the guaranteed 
income model, drawing on specific proposals 
and longstanding debates as they have unfolded 
in Canada and elsewhere. Looking ahead, what 
conclusions should be drawn about guaranteed 
income in Canada for those concerned about 
economic security and social justice?
We began this research with disagreement 
between the two of us. Yet, interestingly, as the 
project has progressed our opinions have come 
closer together. We both share similar concerns 
about the dangers and challenges of practical im-
plementation of a guaranteed income program. 
We both recognize strongly the inadequacy of 
reform to income and social security that in-
cludes only a guaranteed income and neglects 
other forms of collective provision of public 
goods. And we both agree that discussion of a 
guaranteed income is a fruitful exercise and an 
important element of the public debate over the 
future of income security.
Differences do remain. Mulvale is an advo-
cate of eventual implementation of a guaranteed 
income. He remains engaged with the task of 
strategizing on how to modify income security 
Conclusion
arrangements in Canada in incremental, fea-
sible, and carefully considered steps. He notes 
that the collapse of neo-liberalism in the current 
global economic crisis has also led to the trans-
fer of billions of dollars of public money from 
governments to large corporations. So, Mulvale 
argues, citizens and social justice advocates can 
legitimately ask the question: “If governments 
are willing to go to such dramatic lengths to bail 
out General Motors and other huge companies, 
what should our elected representatives be do-
ing to ensure the economic survival of average 
working families and economically vulnerable 
citizens?” He argues for nurturing the current 
shift in public consciousness brought about by 
the weakening of neo-liberalism, the willing-
ness of governments to transfer wealth (at least 
to large corporations), and the ecological im-
perative to lower consumption and to achieve 
environmental sustainability.
Young remains more convinced that welfare 
reform is better served by a mix of programs 
for income support, labour policy, and public 
goods. No doubt, in an ideal world calling for a 
pure and strong guaranteed income, paired with 
state provision of key public goods and other tar-
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geted income benefits, along with labour market 
policy reform, might be clearly best. But that is 
not the world we inhabit. Thus, Young argues 
that enhanced social assistance—incorporating 
significant improvements to benefit levels and 
eligibility, in combination with important pub-
lic goods and labour market reforms, is a more 
strategic and potentially effective set of poverty 
reduction goals.
Nonetheless, the notion of a guaranteed in-
come functions for Young as a timely and im-
portant reminder of what must necessarily be a 
basic aspiration of any income security reform. 
Mulvale concurs. Guaranteed income security, 
justified by many of the reasons set out above, 
can be understood as a goal to be realized by a 
combination of different policies, legal reforms, 
and government programs. It need not necessar-
ily stake an urgent claim to a specific, concrete 
program. It can inspire and catalyze a variety of 
other reforms that together offer a complex ma-
trix of income security. 
So in the short to middle term, in any case, 
we agree. It is best to work to achieve a strong-
er and more generous version of our current 
“mixed welfare” model of income security that 
would more strongly align with principles such 
as universality, unconditionality, and adequacy. 
And, it is important to work for other social jus-
tice reforms as well.
Such reform efforts should be based upon a 
broad understanding of poverty. Poverty is more 
than a simple lack of financial resources. To be 
sure, absence of money is an essential character-
istic of poverty and distinguishes it from other 
circumstances of low levels of well-being. But 
poverty is also marked by social exclusion, and 
by inadequate access to public goods, commu-
nity networks and resources, and political capi-
tal. This fuller notion of poverty is well-accepted; 
for example, various United Nations documents 
speak of poverty as limited opportunities for 
well-being, covering such things as being ad-
equately fed, clothed and sheltered, taking part 
in the civil, social and political life of a commu-
nity, having meaningful employment opportuni-
ties, and having affordable housing.69 Quebec’s 
anti-poverty legislation, An act to combat pov-
erty and social exclusion, defines poverty as “the 
condition of a human being who is deprived of 
the resources, means, choices and power nec-
essary to acquire and maintain economic self-
sufficiency or to facilitate integration and par-
ticipation in society.”70 
With this understanding of poverty in mind, 
we both agree there are key elements of reform 
that must be in any program of income securi-
ty, regardless of whether a guaranteed income is 
also part of the package. First, we need to strive 
for the continued and enhanced collective pro-
vision of essential goods — goods and services 
that everyone should be able to access. These are 
things such as education, health care, childcare, 
and so on. These goods are best provided univer-
sally by government. Without the base of such a 
well-developed welfare state, people will remain 
in need, despite guaranteed income grants.
Second, labour market policy reform is critical, 
especially for those most vulnerable in the paid 
labour market, such as women. The issues of pre-
carious work and workplace justice must be part 
of any program of income security advocacy. This 
will require such things as a higher and adequate 
minimum wage, better paid care-giving leave for 
days when children and other family members 
are sick, flexible hours of work, and adequate ma-
ternity and parental leave support. 
Third, any reform must include ready access 
to universal, affordable, and high quality early 
childhood education and care that is available as 
a public service. Along with good employment 
policies, universal childcare will significantly 
enable many of the poor to leave their pover-
ty behind. This reform is essential to women’s 
equality in particular.
Finally, as the above three points illustrate, 
it is unlikely that any one single social program 
can provide the full range of services and income 
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income security reform. It is evocative of what a 
just and fair society must guarantee to everyone: 
an adequate degree of unconditional economic 
independence and empowerment. We may disa-
gree as to the priority and form such recognition 
should take. However, the debate over a guaranteed 
income is critically taken up, if only to remind us 
of some of the key necessary ingredients of eco-
nomic security for all people in Canada. 
support that our society ought to guarantee. A 
guaranteed income alone cannot satisfy the full 
scope of collective and public responsibility a 
just society bears for the welfare of its popula-
tion. Proponents of a guaranteed income should 
be cautious about too singular a focus in their 
welfare reform urgings.
Nonetheless, discussion of a guaranteed in-
come is certainly valuable to any full debate over 
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